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Summary
Decision making is a complex process in which different
sources of information are combined into a decision variable
(DV) that guides action [1, 2]. Neurophysiological studies
have typically sought insight into the dynamics of the deci-
sion-making process and its neural mechanisms through
statistical analysis of large numbers of trials from sequen-
tially recorded single neurons or small groups of neurons
[3–6]. However, detecting and analyzing the DV on individual
trials has been challenging [7]. Here we show that by
recording simultaneously from hundreds of units in prearc-
uate gyrus of macaque monkeys performing a direction
discrimination task, we can predict the monkey’s choices
with high accuracy and decode DV dynamically as the deci-
sion unfolds on individual trials. This advance enabled us to
study changes of mind (CoMs) that occasionally happen
before the final commitment to a decision [8–10]. On indi-
vidual trials, the decoded DV varied significantly over time
and occasionally changed its sign, identifying a potential
CoM. Interrogating the systemby randomstopping of the de-
cision-making process during the delay period after stim-
ulus presentation confirmed the validity of identified CoMs.
Importantly, the properties of the candidate CoMs also con-
formed to expectations based on prior theoretical and
behavioral studies [8]: they were more likely to go from an
incorrect to a correct choice, they were more likely for
weak and intermediate stimuli than for strong stimuli, and
they were more likely earlier in the trial. We suggest that
simultaneous recording of large neural populations pro-
vides a good estimate of DV and explains idiosyncratic as-
pects of the decision-making process that were inaccessible
before.Results
Psychophysical studies of the decision-making process in
various contexts suggest an underlying neural mechanism
based on integration of evidence toward a decision criterion
[11–17]. Supporting evidence for thismechanism has emerged
from electrophysiological studies of the parietal cortex, frontal
cortex, basal ganglia, and superior colliculus of monkeys
performing simple perceptual decisions [3, 5, 18–22]. More4Co-first author
*Correspondence: roozbeh@nyu.edurecently, magnetoencephalography, electroencephalography,
and functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have re-
vealed homologous mechanisms in the human brain [23–26].
Although these studies have significantly advanced our
understanding of the decision-making process, they have
mainly relied on statistical analyses across trials because of
the stochastic nature of spiking activity at the single-neuron
level. Yet tracking the evolution of the decision variable (DV)
on single trials and relating fluctuations in the DV to internal
cognitive states and overt behavior are critical for incisive tests
of current models of decision making. Recent advances in
multielectrode recording promise to break this barrier through
measurement and analysis of the underlying neural population
responses on single trials. So far, this ability has been mainly
used in the field of neural prosthetics, where accurate, real-
time decoding of neural population responses is necessary
for guidance of motor prosthetic devices (e.g., [27, 28]).
However, similar techniques can also be used to advance
our understanding of cognitive processes, especially decision
making [7, 29].
We used 96-channel multielectrode arrays to record from
neural populations in area 8Ar of the prearcuate gyrus of two
macaque monkeys while they performed a direction discrimi-
nation task [30, 31] (Figure 1A). On each trial, the monkey
viewed a patch of randomly moving dots for 800 ms. After a
delay period of variable length, the monkey received the
‘‘go’’ cue and reported the perceived motion direction by
making a saccadic eye movement to one of the two available
targets (T1 and T2). The multielectrode array covered
4 mm 3 4 mm of the cortical surface (Figure 1B) and enabled
us to record simultaneously from hundreds of single- andmul-
tineuron units in a significant portion of the prearcuate gyrus.
Compatible with previous studies, many units showed differ-
ential activity for the two choices during the motion viewing
and delay periods [20, 32], in addition to the perisaccadic
period [33] (Figure 1C).
To explore the efficacy of simultaneous, high-density
recording for analyzing dynamics of the decision-making pro-
cess, we trained a logistic classifier to predict the monkey’s
upcoming choice based on neural population responses at
successive times during individual trials (100 ms sliding win-
dow; see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures). The
classifier finds a set of linear weights ðw!Þ on the population
neural responses ð r!Þ that maximizes the probability of
correctly predicting the choice. Although it is possible to
improve the prediction accuracy by adopting more-sophisti-
cated nonlinear models, in this report we adhere to the linear
model for its simplicity and biological plausibility. Other
models yielded qualitatively similar results. Figure 2A shows
the cross-validated accuracy (see the Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures) of our model, averaged across sessions.
Model prediction accuracy is near chance at the beginning of
the trial but rises quicklyw200ms aftermotion onset, reaching
perfection just before the saccade.
Across 15 data sets, the prediction accuracy of the popula-
tion responses was much higher than that of the average
single unit (Figure 2B). In the 100 ms window immediately
before the ‘‘go’’ cue, the cross-validated accuracy of
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Figure 1. Multielectrode Recording from the
Prearcuate Gyrus during a Direction Discrimina-
tion Task
(A) Behavioral task. The monkey views 800 ms of
random dot motion while maintaining its gaze on
a central fixation point. The strength and direction
of motion varied randomly from trial to trial. After
a variable delay period, the monkey received the
‘‘go’’ signal (fixation point disappeared) and re-
ported the perceived motion direction with a
saccadic eye movement to one of two visual tar-
gets. Correct responseswere rewardedwith juice
after a short hold period.
(B) Two macaque monkeys were implanted with
multichannel electrode arrays in the prearcuate
gyrus, which is marked with a blue box on the
lateral surface of a typical macaque brain (top;
University of Wisconsin Brain Collection). The
exact location of each array with respect to the
arcuate (as) and principal (ps) sulci is shown for
each monkey (bottom). The white squares on
the array show the locations of the ground pins.
The portions of the principal and arcuate sulci
that were visible in the craniotomy are indicated
with black lines. Dashed segments at the end of
a sulcus indicate that the sulcus extended in
that direction beyond our window of visibility.
(C) Average responses of two example prearcu-
ate units for correct ipsilateral and contralateral
choices. The units were recorded from the same
electrode in the same session but had different
motion and saccade selectivities. Shading indi-
cates mean 6 SEM.
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1543the population prediction was close to 0.9 on average
(mean 6 SEM: 0.86 6 0.01), whereas the average accuracy
of individual units was barely above chance (mean 6 SEM:
0.557 6 0.001) and was significantly smaller than that of the
population (t test, p < 1028). More importantly, not only was
population performance better than the average single unit,
but it was consistently superior to the best unit recorded in
each session (Figure 2C; t test, p = 3 3 1025). The population
was superior to individual units in other time epochs as well
(data not shown).
The increased prediction accuracy afforded by multielec-
trode recording enabled more accurate tracking of the deci-
sion variable over time. In essence, our logistic regression
finds the best hyperplane that separates the population
response patterns associated with the two choices. The pop-
ulation response pattern at eachmoment can be envisioned as
a point in a high-dimensional space whose axes are the firing
rates of individual units. The distance of this point from the
discriminant hyperplane ðw!T r!Þ represents the strength of
model’s prediction: a small distance corresponds to low cer-
tainty about the monkey’s upcoming choice, and a large dis-
tance corresponds to high certainty. We call this distance
‘‘model decision variable.’’ Themodel DV provides an estimate
of themonkey’s internal DV, especially when themodel predic-
tion accuracy is high. Averaged across trials, the model DV
gradually increased from zero to large values (positive and
negative values corresponded to T1 and T2 predictions,
respectively; Figure 3A). The rate of this rise depended on
the strength of motion, especially during the motion-viewing
period (Figure 3A, inset): DV increased more rapidly for stron-
ger stimuli, compatible with previous observations in parietal
and prefrontal neurons, where the rate of change of neural re-
sponses depends on the strength of sensory evidence [3, 6,
20, 34, 35].Similarly, on individual trials, the DV fluctuated around
the discriminant hyperplane at the beginning of the
motion-viewing period but gradually moved farther from
the hyperplane over time. After gaining an initial distance, the
population-basedDV typically stayed on one side of the hyper-
plane during the late motion-viewing period and the ensuing
delay (Figure 3B, two example trials). On a minority of trials,
however, the population response crossed from one side of
the hyperplane to the other side during the trial, signaling a
shift in the predicted choice from one target to the other (Fig-
ure 3C, two example trials).
An intriguing possibility is that these changes in DV sign,
calculated from the neural population response, identify
changes of mind (CoMs) that occur in human and animal
observers as they make choices on the basis of variable evi-
dence [7–10]. Alternatively, however, changes in sign of the
DV might simply reflect noise from any number of sources
that are irrelevant to performance on the task.
We conducted four analyses to test whether observed vari-
ations in the DV reflect, at least in part, genuine changes of
mind. The first analysis concerns the reliability of DV fluctua-
tions for monitoring the momentary ‘‘decision state’’ of the
system as time passes during long-duration trials. The remain-
ing three analyses assess whether intratrial DV sign changes
conform to change-of-mind properties that are predicted by
decision-making models and empirically observed in humans
and monkeys performing a similar decision-making task.
Prediction of Choice Is Reliable throughout Long Delay
Periods
The initial important question is whether intratrial sign changes
in the DV, like those illustrated in Figure 3C, are simply noise or
whether they accurately reflect moment-to-moment variation
in the decision state of the system—the decision that would
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Figure 2. The Recorded Neural Populations
Afford High Accuracy Prediction of the Monkeys’
Choices
(A) Prediction accuracy of the recorded popula-
tion for the monkey’s choice. A logistic model
was fit to 90% of the trials in each session and
was used to predict the choice in the remaining
10%, in sliding 100 ms bins. The dark trace and
shading indicate mean 6 SEM across the ses-
sions. The horizontal black bar indicates the
time window that was used in the analyses in (B)
and (C).
(B) The neural population classifier is a better pre-
dictor of the monkey’s choice than the average of
the individual units recorded in a session. The
probability densities of population and individual
unit choice prediction accuracies are highly
distinct. Prediction accuracies were calculated
for a 100 ms window immediately before the
‘‘go’’ cue.
(C) Comparison of population choice prediction
accuracy with the mean (left) and best (right) indi-
vidual units. Each point represents one data
collection session. Even the best individual units
are inferior to the population.
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1544be made if the trial were to end now. We addressed this
question by separately analyzing predictive accuracy of the
population activity for trials of different delay period duration.
During each experiment, the duration of the delay period was
varied randomly among several preset values (see the Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). We grouped the trials into
quintiles based on the length of the delay period. For each
quintile, we then calculated the hyperplane that best sepa-
rated the T1 and T2 choice trials from the pattern of neural pop-
ulation response in the 100 ms immediately before the ‘‘go’’
cue. For all quintiles, the model achieved high cross-validated
accuracies for predicting the monkey’s choice on individual
trials (Figure 4A; 0.76 6 0.02 for the shortest delays to 0.87 6
0.02 for the longest delay). The results were not critically
dependent on using a separate model for each quintile; similar
results were obtained when a single model was used for all
quintiles (Figure S1 available online). Although predictive ac-
curacy improved modestly for longer delay periods, it was
far above chance even for the shortest delays. Thus, the sign
of the DV during the delay period is a good predictor of choice,
even for the shortest-duration trials.
Importantly, there is no distinction between long- and short-
duration trials prior to the first possible ‘‘go’’ signal—the tem-
poral structures of the trials are identical until that point. Thus,
predictive accuracy of the DV sign measured prior to the ‘‘go’’
signal on shorter-duration trials provides an objective estimate
of predictive accuracy on longer-duration trials had those trials
ended at an earlier point in time. We therefore conclude that
DV sign changes on longer-duration trials (e.g., Figure 3C) pro-
vide insight into the momentary decision state of the system,
reflecting in part choices that would have been made had we
terminated the trial earlier.
DV Sign Changes Reflect Expected Properties of
Behavioral Changes of Mind
After identifying candidate CoMs using DV sign changes, we
performed three analyses to determine whether candidate
CoMs exhibit properties that are associated with actual
CoMs in behavioral studies and are expected from current
models of the decision process [7, 8].First, CoMs should happen more frequently for weak- and
intermediate-strength motion stimuli than for strong motion
stimuli because counterevidence that elicits a CoM will occur
less frequently for stronger stimuli [8]. Figure 4B shows
that the predicted trend is indeed present in our data
(Equation S3 in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
b1 = 20.23 6 0.04, p = 1.6 3 10
28).
Second, CoMs are more likely to steer the decision from an
incorrect to a correct option than vice versa because they are
based on evidence that is not yet processed during the initial
stages of choice formation [8, 9]. On average, incorporation
of additional evidence should improve the decision maker’s
accuracy. Consistent with this prediction, we observed that
candidate CoMs derived from our neural population data
were more likely to shift the predicted choices from the incor-
rect target to the correct target (Figure 4C). The difference in
CoM toward correct versus wrong choices was significantly
larger than zero (sign test, p < 1028) and grew as a function
of motion strength (Equation S4 in the Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures, b1 = 0.19 6 0.07, p = 0.009). Thus, CoMs
increased the monkey’s overall reward intake. We also tested
whether the monkey’s final choices after CoMs were more
likely to be correct compared to the trials in which CoMs
were not detected. Controlling for motion strength and delay
duration, we found no significant difference between the two
trial types (Equation S5 in the Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures, b2 =20.0046 0.043, p = 0.92). Since CoMs improved
the probability of a correct response, they must have occurred
selectively on trials for which the initial decision state was
likely to be incorrect, perhaps due to lapses of attention earlier
in the trial.
Third, the probability of a CoM should decrease as the
monkey waits during the delay period. Due to the finite latency
of visual signals, processing the last sensory evidence neces-
sarily occurs during the delay period, and memory processes
related to the visual stimulus may influence the final decision
as well. As the delay period proceeds, however, a final com-
mitment to a choice is increasingly likely. Consistent with
this hypothesis, we observed a monotonic decline in the
probability of a CoM with delay period duration (Figure 4D;
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Figure 3. The Model Decision Variable Indicates Accumulation of Evidence
over Time, and Intratrial Changes in the Sign of the DV Identify Candidate
Changes of Mind
A logistic regression (Equation S1 in the Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures) was used to find the best hyperplane that separates the population
response patterns corresponding to the two choices. The distance of the
population response pattern from this discriminant hyperplane represents
themodel belief about the upcoming choice.We call this distance themodel
decision variable, or DV.
(A) Average decision variable across the sessions. The inset shows that the
buildup of the decision variable during the motion-viewing period depends
on stimulus strength (H, motion strengthR 20%; L, motion strength% 6%).
The dark traces and shading represent the mean 6 SEM.
(B) Two sample trials in which the model DV built up to a positive (solid) or
negative (dashed) value and maintained its sign throughout the trial. The
trials ended with T1 and T2 choices, respectively.
(C) Two sample trials in which the sign of the model DV flipped during the
delay period, indicating a change of predicted choice based on the model.
Arrows indicate the time of flip.
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1545Equation S6 in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
b2 = 20.21 6 0.01, p < 10
28).
The success of the model for the delay period encouraged
us to investigate the properties of candidate CoMs during
the motion-viewing interval as well, even though success
was less certain for two reasons. First, because we used a
constant stimulus duration in all experiments, we were unable
to validate candidate CoMs duringmotion viewing using short-
duration trials as described above for the delay period. Sec-
ond, candidate CoMs were less reliable during motion viewing
as reflected in the lower predictive power of the model during
this interval (Figure 2A). Nevertheless, the properties of candi-
date CoMs during the motion-viewing interval were similar to
those during the delay period. CoMs were less frequent forstronger stimuli (Figure S2A; Equation S3 in the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures, b1 =20.0646 0.021, p = 0.003) and
were more likely to change the DV in the direction of a correct
judgment (Figure S2B; Equation S4 in the Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures, b1 = 0.716 0.18, p = 0.001). The frequency
of candidate CoMs at the beginning of the motion-viewing
period was low because the DV is initially near chance and
must first build up toward one of the choices before a CoM
can be detected reliably (see the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). Thus, CoM frequency increased initially but
declined after 300 ms of motion viewing (Figure S2C) due to
increased likelihood of commitment to a choice, consistent
with the delay period results (Figure 4D). These results from
the motion-viewing period are encouraging but should be in-
terpreted cautiously because of sensitivity of some results
(Figure S2C) to time window sizes (see the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures).
Overall, candidate CoMs identified from high-density re-
cordings of prefrontal cortex conform to all three predictions
based on behavioral analysis of changes of mind.
Discussion
Neurophysiological studies have typically sought insight into
the dynamics of decision making and its neural mechanisms
through statistical analysis of large numbers of trials from
sequentially recorded single neurons or small groups of neu-
rons. Measurement and analysis of the DV on individual trials
has been challenging due to technical and conceptual limita-
tions. We sought to overcome these limitations by (1)
recording simultaneously from hundreds of units in cortical
areas hypothesized to contribute to the decision-making pro-
cess, (2) developing simple, efficient algorithms for estimation
of the covert DV from neural population responses, and (3) im-
plementing a new analytic approach to verify the accuracy of
the estimated DV fluctuations during the delay period.
The ability to track moment-to-moment variation of the DV
enables the study of important aspects of the decision-making
process that have been largely inaccessible thus far. As a
proof of concept, we focused on changes of mind during peri-
threshold judgments of motion direction. Our behavioral task
created fertile conditions for CoMs due to the noisy, tempo-
rally extended nature of the visual motion stimulus. Our first
new finding is that the covert DV can be accurately tracked
during single behavioral trials using the methods introduced
in this paper. Crucially, trials with short delay periods verify
the accuracy of estimates of the covert DV on longer trials; in
essence, short-delay trials act as ‘‘probes’’ of ongoing DV
estimates on longer trials [34, 36, 37]. Our second new finding
is that changes in the sign of the DV identify candidate CoMs
and that candidate CoMs conform to three different pre-
dictions based on prior behavioral and modeling studies.
Together, these results demonstrate the power of high-density
neural recordings for single-trial estimates of the fluctuating
DV and for detection of covert changes in decision state
commonly referred to as changes of mind.
CoMs can arise from various sources: changing sensory
evidence [8], correction of an initial confusion about stim-
ulus-response association [9], incorporation of a new decision
policy, or retrieval of new information from memory [8]. Our
monkeys’ CoMsmay stem fromany of these sources or others,
such as simple lapses in attention or effort. Accumulated over
time, CoMs tend to be self-corrections, often benefitting the
decision maker by improving accuracy. By characterizing
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Figure 4. The Sign of the Model DV Reliably
Reflects the Incipient Decision throughout the
Delay Period
Intratrial changes in the sign of the DV conform to
CoM properties expected from theoretical and
behavioral studies.
(A) Cross-validated prediction accuracy of the
monkey’s choice for different delay durations.
Trials were grouped into quintiles based on delay
period duration. Accurate choice prediction on
short-duration trials confirms that variation in DV
reflects the monkey’s decision state at early points
in long-duration trials. Thus, intratrial changes in
DV sign are consistent with CoM as opposed to
extraneous noise (see the Results).
(B) Probability of switching from one predicted
choice to another in consecutive delay quintiles
declines for stronger motion (C1, motion strength
% 6%; C2, 6% < motion strength % 20%; C3, mo-
tion strength > 20%).
(C) Switches in the predicted choice were more
likely to rectify an erroneous choice, especially for
stronger motion stimuli.
(D) Switches were more frequent early during
delay.
Error bars indicate the SEM. See also Figures S1
and S2.
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1546the neural DV and identifying CoMs on individual trials, we
show that monkeys, like humans, exhibit self-correcting
behavior.
Past studies have documented cortical and subcortical
fluctuations in neural activity that might correspond to
changes of mind [7, 29, 38]. Those studies focused on the
detection of discrete hidden states in the responses of single
neurons [38] or small numbers of simultaneously recorded
neurons [7, 29]. The discrete states are defined as specific
patterns of spiking across the recorded population. Transi-
tions from one state to another —often formalized by a hidden
Markov model—can occasionally signal changes of mind.
Here we extend those studies by extracting a continuous
measure of the DV, characterizing its dynamics, and confirm-
ing the inferred CoMs by interrogating the monkey’s choice
at variable times.
The probabilistic characterization of the choice provides an
analog estimation of the DV, compatible with the quantitative
models of the decision-making process [12, 17, 35, 39]. In
those models, sources of information are integrated into an
analog variable [31] that explains both the choice and reaction
time. However, it remains to be seen whether various factors,
such as priors and value information, that bear on the decision
in those models also modify our estimated DV.
Our model incorporates the responses of all neurons
recorded on the array in a given experiment. Unlike in many
classic single-neuron studies, we did not focus on merely the
units that were highly selective for the motion directions or
target locations used in the task [20, 40, 41]. We do not know
whether all of the recorded neurons contributed to the deci-
sion-making process. Nor do we know the exact role that
they may play in the process. However, the recorded neurons
are informative about the monkey’s upcoming action as indi-
cated by the model’s high prediction accuracy. We simply
exploit this information to provide a probabilistic glimpse
into the DV that supports choice and CoM. Our model is not
a mechanistic account of how the DV is constructed or how
commitment to a choice is made. Addressing those questions
requires further experiments and selective recording andmanipulation of neurons based on their response selectivity
(e.g., [18, 34, 42–44]).
The advent of techniques for routine, simultaneous
recording of tens to hundreds of neurons offers unique oppor-
tunities for cognitive neuroscience, particularly for the detec-
tion and tracking of cognitive states and processes that occur
unpredictably in time and have no overt behavioral correlate.
Covert cognitive processes are difficult to monitor in classical
neurophysiological studies that require time-locking and
across-trial signal averaging, but they are potentially detect-
able in real time from neural population activity. Even when
covert neural processes are detectable, however, their inter-
pretation will depend on creative strategies for behavioral veri-
fication. Our study of CoM offers a first step in that direction.
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